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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
ACCESS TO STRATEGIC MINERALS IN
A TURBULENT WORLD
DR. EwA ANDERSON*
"National security" is a catholic term and, consequently, is resistant to
simple definition; however, the working definition of Trager and Simonie is
an appropriate starting point: "National security is that part of government
policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political
conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values
against existing and potential adversaries."' A major element in this defini-
tion is protection. This is perhaps the key role of the central government and
arguably its only unique function. National security is, however, dependent
not only upon a country's military might but also upon the strength of its
economy. Should hostilities occur, the nation with a well-developed defense
industrial base has the ability to mobilize its full economic potential within
a reasonable time and is likely to prevail. Furthermore, because distinctions
between war and peace are now blurred, and conditions such as armed con-
flict, international crisis, or intense competition blend into each other, "na-
tional security" has acquired political, ideological, and economic connota-
tions, as well as military overtones.
Economic prosperity and national security exist in a symbiotic relationship.
The strength of the economy largely influences the level of research and
development, which in turn affects the sophistication of military requirements.
Only a strong economy can sustain a high level of defense spending and per-
mit the flexibility that enables rapid conversion from peacetime production
to wartime mobilization. A well-structured defense base, especially vital in
the U.S., provides security for allies and trading partners, as well as protec-
tion for lines of global communication. If the economy of the U.S. were to
falter, international commitments might be jeopardized and parts of the essen-
tial trading network might be lost. The result could be that the economy would
be denied certain strategic resources and would decline further, causing defense
production capabilities to be seriously reduced. Thus, national security would
face a vicious descending spiral that would undermine not only the readiness
of the armed services but also the viability of the domestic economy.
The defense industry must have the authority'to decide which minerals are
strategically vital. This is recognized in the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Pile Revision Act of 1979, which provides a two-part definition of
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strategic minerals. The first part defines strategic minerals to be those materials
that would be needed to supply the United States' military, industrial, and
civilian requirements during a national emergency. The second part requires
that the mineral is not produced in the United States in sufficient quantities
to meet such needs. A national emergency is defined as a general declaration
of emergency involving the national defense. The declaration is made by the
President or Congress. Focusing on the first element of the definition, the
Office of Minerals Policy and Research Analysis (Department of the Interior)
for its Critical Minerals Index (1979) considered the importance of the mineral
to the functioning of the United States economy. The definition of the Office
of Technology Assessment Report (1985) considers the requirements for essen-
tial civilian and military uses.2 In these definitions, the element concerned
with the ultimate use is considered the "criticality" of the material. A major
problem, however, is that the defense industry can be variously delimited.
For example, the production of major weapons platforms is so dependent
upon a range of ancillary industries that the boundary of what can be
legitimately called "defense" is blurred. In addition, the requirements of the
machine tool industry, obviously vital in the production of military hardware,
should probably be considered critical. Similarly, from a downstream perspec-
tive, computers and software for command and control systems have become
increasingly essential to defense preparedness. Thus the minerals needed by
a wide range of similar high technology industries should be designated critical.
However, the true point of conjecture from both perspectives becomes how
far back through the production network these materials and their components
can be categorized as critical to national defense.
These problems are compounded by the fact that virtually no detailed trac-
ing of source routes to the ultimate minerals has been attempted for even
major units within defense-related industries. Various attempts are under way
at present to remedy this situation, but the establishment and continued
monitoring of a complete defense industrial data base for the U.S. presents
many difficulties, not the least of which is the changing pattern of supply
and demand. Furthermore, the viability of certain key industries, often at
a lower tier, must be maintained. How this can be achieved with often small,
erratic, but critical defense requirements must be resolved. With a lack of
specific defense-related data, the only alternative method to obtain a percep-
tion of criticality is by examining the industrial base. The broad mineral re-
quirements of such key industries as electronics, energy, machinery, steel, and
transportation are known. They include, for example, nickel, columbium, tan-
talum, titanium, cobalt, chromium, tungsten, and platinum. However, as the
defense industry becomes increasingly dominated by high technology, other
minerals such as indium, gallium, beryllium, and germanium will become in-
creasingly critical. A study of the European North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion aerospace industry concluded that, for various reasons, the following
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minerals were critical and most at risk: chromium, cobalt, hafnium, manganese,
columbium, titanium, tungsten, and vanadium.3
This information can be supplemented by evidence from the few studies
made of individual systems. The best known of these is the study that monitors
the changing requirements of the Pratt and Whitney F-100 Turbofan engine
used in the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. Similarly, the needs of the M-1 tank engine
have been indentified and assessments have been made for the MX system.
Presently, the overall needs of the Strategic Defense Initiative are under
scrutiny. However imperfect the overall knowledge of the industrial defense
base mineral requirements may currently be, at least the relationship between
minerals and national security is clear.
Before a critical mineral is considered strategic, the second part of the various
two-part definitions must be met. In each case, with varying emphasis, this
means that the critical material in question is not produced in the United States
in sufficient quantities to meet such needs, and the resulting import dependence
may lead to a risk of supply interruption. Thus, for a mineral to be designated
strategic the following criteria, listed in their order of application, must be
present: (a) the mineral is critical for defense and defense-related industries;
(b) there is a marked degree of import dependence; and (c) there are few
significant sources of supply. Many critical minerals are obtained from
domestic sources, but reliance on foreign supplies clearly brings vulnerability.
If there are few suppliers, then, in the short-term, there must be the potential
for resource geopolitics. If the number of world producers is restricted,
vulnerability must be at least medium-term; if world reserves are scarce, there
would likely be long-term difficulties.
Using U.S. trade figures compiled by the Bureau of Mines, it is possible
to identify those critical minerals for which there is a high percentage of im-
port reliance.' Prominent among them are manganese (99%), bauxite and
alumina (96%), cobalt (95%), tantalum (94%), platinum-group metals (91 %),
chromium (82%), nickel (74%), and tungsten (71%). There is also a group
of minerals for which statistics are withheld or unavailable, and it is reasonable
to assume that some, such as gallium, indium, rubidium, rhenium, tellurium,
and zirconium, could be considered strategic. Additionally, the U.S. is 91
percent import-reliant for fluorspar, crucial in the production of aluminum
and steel. Thus, because domestic supplies cannot satisfy defense industry
demands, as many as thirty-five minerals can be considered strategic.
Recognizing that a mineral is strategic does not in any way mitigate the
difficulty in defining an acceptable level of dependence that does not con-
stitute unacceptable vulnerability. World trade obviously depends upon par-
ity of advantage, and the U.S. is the major advocate of free trade. Therefore,
to assess vulnerability, the key suppliers must be identified and examined in
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light of the current world geopolitical scene. The major actors can be
characterized as superpowers, mesopowers and micropowers, all of which are
of some significance when mineral reserves are considered. The U.S. has fre-
quently obtained strategic minerals from the other superpower, the USSR,
and currently is dependent on the Soviets for supplies of platinum-group
metals. Among the important mesopowers are Brazil and South Africa, while
several micropowers, such as Guinea, Gabon, and Bolivia, are of significance.
Interaction among these actors within varying global, regional, and local
scenarios produces the responses that feed back and affect the system. For
example, changing access to strategic minerals may alter not only the environ-
ment but also the power relationships.
A basic idea of U.S. geopolitical vulnerability can be obtained by examin-
ing the chief mineral sources with regard to: (a) potential political stability,
(b) distance and possible logistical problems, (c) political orientation toward
the U.S., (d) state of development of the mining industry, the infrastructure,
and the mining history. Thus, for example, Canada, geographically contiguous
and with land-based communications, must be considered the most secure
source, followed by Mexico. At a level less reliable must be the politically
stable countries situated at varying distances from the U.S. but reliant upon
sea-lines of communication. These countries include the countries of the Com-
mon Market, Australia, and Japan. At a lower level are the countries of South
America and the Caribbean, which, though enjoying differing levels of political
stability, have the advantage of close proximity. Below this level are the less
reliable sources: the potentially unstable less developed countries, countries
with centrally planned economies, such as the USSR, and South Africa. South
Africa is an interesting case. Although it has never seriously threatened to
interrupt supplies to the U.S., the present political scene gives little oppor-
tunity for optimism.
After considering the various strategic minerals and their respective sources,
the percentage of reliance upon each is then examined. If at least 50 percent
of a strategic mineral originates from reasonably secure sources, then
geopolitical risks are minimal. If, on the other hand, the figure is lower than
50 percent closer scrutiny is required. In such cases, a country providing as
little as 20 percent of supplies can be considered a key source. Such an analysis
indicates that there are five major suppliers to the U.S., each providing more
than one critical mineral. These are Canada, Australia, South Africa, Mex-
ico, and Western Europe. In the case of Western Europe, the reliance is chiefly
upon refined minerals, for which there is a European dependence upon the
primary sources. Except for Thailand, the other key suppliers providing one
strategic mineral are Latin America: Jamaica, Brazil; Africa: Guinea, Gabon,
Zaire (Zambia, Zimbabwe); Southeast Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, and the
Peoples Republic of China. A detailed risk analysis of each of these
demonstrates that, geopolitically, the major areas at risk are the countries
of Africa, followed by those of Southeast Asia. The Peoples Republic of China,
as a result of its political orientation, needs to be considered separately.
To carry out such a risk assessment, a model was developed and widely
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tested.' Geopolitical factors arise from the interplay at various levels of
geography and politics. For convenience, the levels can be designated local,
regional, and global. In certain cases, one level may be more important than
another or may be totally irrelevant. Furthermore, the effect of a global
political variable may well be felt on all three geographical levels, and con-
versely, a local geographical factor may influence political variables at all three
levels. The key geographical elements are location and distance. Location im-
plies the total physical and human geography with a concentration upon the
key sources of strategic minerals. Distance varies according to the mode of
transport and the route taken, but on all three levels there may be geographical
influences. These may range from constraints at a particular port to problems
of regional infrastructure or global choke points.
The relevant political input can be described as "policy," a resultant of
several factors. Examples at the global level would be world trading and defense
policies, while regionally, policies may result from the stance of a particular
group of states, for example the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC). Locally, policies will be either national or within national sub-
divisions and may concern such crucial aspects as labor, tax, development,
and the environment. Thus the geopolitical environment becomes a product
of the interplay between political decisions made by political bodies at global,
regional, and local levels interacting with the factors of location and distance.
Having assessed the key sources, the other major elements in the global
infrastructure are the routes that must be used to transport strategic minerals
to the U.S. Under normal circumstances, in all cases except that of platinum-
group metals, strategic minerals are transported by sea. Therefore, the crucial
routes for the United States are those from the Caribbean and the eastern
coast of South America, southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and Australia. The
risks associated with these particular routes can be related not only to the
overall distance, but also to the orientation of littoral states and particularly
the dispositions of world choke points. Choke points occur where sea-lane
restrictions lead to a concentration of shipping within a limited area. The
most obvious constraints result from the configuration of the land, in which
case freedom of navigation is often further curtailed by the restrictive depths
of certain bodies of water. In such confined waters, islands, sandbanks, and
wrecks, together with the normal activities of ferries and fishing boats, con-
stitute hazards. The other major choke points are those constructed artifi-
cially by man, principally the Suez and Panama canals.
The number of natural choke points has been estimated at anything from
100 to 200; however, if the term is restricted to straits of under 24 nautical
miles in width, the number varies between 109 and 119. Also, to save costs,
ships tend to take the shortest routes. This leads to further concentration
around headlands and promontories, such as the Cape of Good Hope, one
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of the more important choke points of the world. The major factor in assess-
ing the importance of a particular route or choke point usually is the ship
count, but the cost of alternative routes must also be considered. Vulnerabil-
ity tends also to depend upon crucial geography, the characteristics of the
submarine configuration, and the political posture of the riparian states. Taking
these factors into account, the most important choke points in the world are
Bab el Mandeb, Dover Strait, the Dardanelles, the Strait of Gibraltar, the
Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. Important, but of less
significance, are the Florida Strait, the Strait of Luzon, Lombok Strait, the
Mona Passage, Oresund, and the Windward Passage. Each, of course, needs
to be assessed individually with regard to particular risks, but it is clear that
the U.S. is critically dependent for materials that transit the Southeast Asian,
Caribbean, Red Sea, and Mediterranean choke points, together with Dover
Strait. Furthermore, many strategic minerals are transported from South
African ports and therefore need to round the Cape of Good Hope.
Thus, in summary, it is possible, by relating particular strategic minerals
to their sources and sea-lines of communication to the U.S., to make an overall
global assessment of vulnerability. Changes at any position within this struc-
ture, from the transport network or energy supply source of the supplier coun-
try to difficulties at the home ports, can lead to restrictions in supply. Fur-
thermore, the capability of the U.S. Merchant Marine to transport the minerals
under different environmental conditions must also be analyzed. For the
world's greatest ocean-trading nation, the fleet is not only very small and
out of date, but also restricted in certain crucial categories. As these various
problems potentially influence reliability, they impinge upon the economy and
thus the national security of the United States.
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